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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VVILLIA.M J. COLMAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsDUANE C. ANDERSON and ELLEN R. ANDERSON, his wife,

Civil No.
12717

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
II
(A) NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Colman against
Anderson and his wife to recover money loaned by Colman to Anderson and to recover damages sustained by
Colman by reason of the wrongful conversion of stock
owned by Colman by Anderson.
(B) DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
THE LOWER COURT
The lower court held all issues against Colman, no
cause of action.
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(C) RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Colman, seeks reversal of the judgment by the court, no cause of action, recovery of damages by reason of the conversion and the money loaned
by Colman to Anderson and the reversal of certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law formed by the
court.
(D) STATEMENT OF FACTS

We wish to first state the facts which we contend
are not in controversy and separately state the facts
which are in dispute.
FACTS WHICH ARE NOT IN
CONTROVERSY
In November of 1967, the Respondent, Anderson,
went to the Appellant, Colman, and asked for a loan
of $1,000.00, which Colman advanced. Anderson at the
time delivered to Colman as surety a quit claim deed to
property in Box Elder County, defendant's Exhibit
No. 3 in the record.
Later the same month, Anderson asked Colman to
lend him an additional $1,100.00 which Colman did.
There were no written instruments to these transactions
except the quit claim deed from Anderson to Colman.
Still later in the month, Anderson again asked Colman for a loan. Colman informed Anderson that he had
no ready money available. Anderson then told Colman
that he had a loan with Miller Finance Company coming due and that the loan would not be renewed unless
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he, Anderson, could deposit collateral with the Finance
Company and asked Cohnan to furnish him such collateral. Colman delivered to Anderson 10,000 shares of
street stock in Kennebeck Mining Company. Anderson
then delivered the stock to l\iiller Finance Company as
collateral for his loan.
See testimony of Colman R 97 & 98 Trans 20 & 21 .
See testimony of Anderson Rl57, 158 &
159 - Trans 80, 81 & 82
Anderson became in default in the payment of his
loan to .l\Iiller. Anderson then attempted to obtain a
loan to pay .Miller and for additional money elsewhere.
He contacted one George Hackett who loaned Anderson the money to pay :Miller on condition that he deliver up to Hackett the 10,000 shares of Kennebeck
stock. On June 12, 1968, Anderson delivered up the
stock together with a document of conveyance which
is reproduced in this brief as Appendix "A"t and which
was received as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9 in the Record.
Hackett then paid Miller $4,177.00 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 14 in the Record) and pursuant to Anderson's instruction l\iiller delivered the 10,000 shares of
Kennebeck stock (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 in the
Record. (Reproduced in this Brief as Appendix "B")
Before Anderson's note to Hackett was due,
Hackett sold the Kennebeck stock for some $19,000.00.
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This was some time in June of 1968 and very shortly
after the stock was delivered to Hackett.
93

See Anderson testimony R 170 - Trans

Anderson advised Colman that he had pledged the
stock with Hackett and Colman advised Anderson that
he would pay the amount due Hackett to obtain possession of the stock. Possession of the stock was never
obtained.
See Anderson testimony R 168 - Trans 91
Colman and Anderson then went to attorney Frank
Allen and an action was commenced by Anderson
agaist Hackett for damages. Colman was later joine<l
as a party plaintiff. This action was settled for some
$19,000.00, $14,000.00 of it going to Colman and the
balance applied to Anderson's obligat;on to Hackett.
See opening Statement by Summerhays
R 85 - Trans 8
See testimony Anderson R 176 - Trans 99
After the settlement of the Racket case Anderson
promised Colman he would take care of Colman's loss.
Testimony of Colman R 109 - Trans 32
Testimony of Allen R 126 & 127 - Trans
49-50
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Testimony of Anderson R 176 - Trans 99
This action was then commenced by Colman
against Anderson to recover the balance of the loss suffered by Colman by reason of the alleged acts of Anderson.
DISPUTED FACTS
The pertinent facts which are in substantial dispute,
in our opinion, are as to when Anderson informed Colman of his dealings with Hackett, the arrangement
made for the payment of attorney's fees in the Anderson vs. Hackett lawsuit, the application of the proceeds
of the sale of the stock of the Consolidated l\'Iining
Company given by Anderson to Cohnan.
These matters will be discussed further m the
course of the argument.
ARGUMENT
We think that at the outset it would be well to define the issues as they are framed by the pleadings.
The plaintiff in his complaint (Record pages 2 and
3) prayed for damages by reason of the conversion of
stock and for the assignment of stock by reason of the
conveyance by the defendant of the original collateral
given by the defendant to the plaintiff to secure the
loan.
The defendant in his answer by way of relief asks
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only that the complaint be dismissed and asks for no affirmative relief.

A.

Did the defendant convert the stock of the
plaintiff?

The 10,000 shares of Kennebeck stock were loaned
by Colman to Anderson for the specific purpose of sesuring a loan Anderson had with Miller Finance Company and for no other purpose. Anderson represented
to Colman that he was in the process of obtaining a loan
and that out of the proceeds of that loan he could pay
the Miller note and return the stock. (Record 98, Trans.
21) (Record 159, Trans. 82)
On June 12 or 13, 1968, the defendant by an unconditional conveyance, transferred and delivered the
10,000 shares of stock to George Hackett (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 9 and 5, Appendix "A" and "B" of this
Brief).

It is plaintiff's position that Anderson by exercising all of the rights of ownership of the stock at this
time converted the stock owned by the plaintiff.
18 Am Jur 2nd 151, Section 1 defines a conversion as
follows:
"A conversion is a distinct act of dominion
wrongfully exerted over another's personal
property denial of or inconsistent with h;s title
or rights therein, or in derogation, exclusion, or
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defiance of such title or rights. A conversion
takes place where a person does such acts in
reference to the personal property of another
as amount, in view of the law, to the appropriation of the property to himself. Indeed, the
general rule is that there is no conversion until
some act is done which is a denial or violation
of the plaint;ff's dominion over or rights in the
property."
and Section 2 says:
"An act accompanied by a wrongful assertion
of ownership, or by a wrongful denial of the
plaintiff's ownership, may be a conversion.
But a mere assertion of °''"nership which in no
way injures the owner of the property is ordinarily not regarded as constituting a conversion. This rule has been applied to an assertion
of ownership made to a stranger, not within the
presence of the real owner, and not within sight
of the property."
As a result of Anderson's wrongful exercise of
dominion over the stock, he placed a third person,
Hackett, in a position to dispose of the stock and to forever preclude Colman from obtaining possession of the
stock ..l\Ir. Anderson had been in the business of dealing
in oil leases, mining development, land development and
dealing in stocks and bonds for a period of 30 years
( R 132, Tras. 55). He appreciated fully the conse-
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quences of his act in transferring the stock to Hackett.
As a business man of many years experience he must
have realized that the document he executed was not the
usual pledge of collateral.

B. The effect of the Anderson vs. Hackett suit.
There were two separate and distinct conversions
of the stock, one by Anderson on June 12, 1968, and
one by Hackett some time later in June of 1968. The
first conversion by Anderson made possible the second
conversion by Hackett. This position is further substantiated by the fact that Anderson immediately commenced suit against Hackett for conversion. Colman
was joined only because he was the lawful owner of the
stock. Anderson recognized that he had wrongfully
damaged Colman and that any recovery from Hackett
would go to Colman in dimunition of Anderson's liability to Colman for his, Anderson's, wrongful conversion.
Anderson at all times recognized and acknowledged an
obligation to Colman. The evidence is undisputed that
Anderson told Colman in the presence of Frank Allen
that he, Anderson, would make things right to Colman,
this after the settlement with Hackett. (See references
to testimony cited in Statement of Facts)
It is obvious from the testimony in the record that
at this time Anderson did not have the money to finance
a suit against Hackett and again Colman furnished the
financing.
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It would seem a travesty on equity to allow Anderson to satisfy an obligation which he owed first to Miller and then to Hackett, by the use and the proceeds
from stock owned by Colman and wrongfully converted
by Anderson. This is exactly what will happen if Anderson is not compelled to reimburse Colman for the
$4,277.00 applied to Anderson's debt in the Hackett
settlement. It would be a further travesty to compel
Colman to pay the attorney's fees of $3,200.00 paid by
Colman to further a dimunition in the obligation Anderson had to Colman.

C.

Damages.

There are many conflicting rules relating to the
measure of damages for the wrongful conversion of corporate stock.
All of the rules are discussed and an extensive
compilation of the cases are compiled in an annotation
to be found at 31ALR3rd 1289. Among the rules discussed at length is the so-called New York Rule.
The Utah Court in the case of Western Securities
Company v. Silver King Consolidated lt.Lining Co., 57
Utah 88, 192 P 664, speaking through Justice Frick,
categorically adopted the so-called New York Rule as
the law in Utah.
The New York Rule is briefly the highest value
the stock reaches within a reasonable time after the discovery of the conversion.
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We also wish to call the Court's attention to the
case of TVilson v. Colorado 'il'Iining Company, 227 Federal 721, decided by the Eighth Circuit at the time Utah
was in that Circuit, the case arose in Utah.
In this case, the court ordered that in case the stock
certificate was not returned within 90 days, it should
pay the plaintiff in addition to intervening dividends
and interest an amount equal to the highest intermediate
value of the stock "between July, 1900 and January 1,
1909, a reasonable time for him to have purchased the
shares after he discovered their misappropriation, and
interest on that amount from that date."

It is the law under the New York Rule that what

constitutes a reasonable time is dependent on the circumstances in each case. A reasonable time in the instant
case would be the period of time between the date of the
convers;on, June 12, 1968 and the date of the settlement
with Hackett, .March 24, 1970.
It was impossible for Colman to determine what his
loss would be until such time as Anderson made a recovery from Hackett in dimunition of Colman's damage.
Anderson had agreed that any recovery made by him
would go to Colman and he had also stated that the recovery from Hackett did not compensate Colman for
the injury suffered by reason of the conversion by Anderson.

There was a sale of the stock on l\lay 26, 1969, for
$7.25 a share which would place the value of the stock
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at $72,500.00, see Exhibit P4. The settlement with
Hackett was for $19,000.00, this took into account the
sum of $4,227.00 which Anderson owed Hackett by
reason of the payment by Hackett of the Anderson
note due Miller Finance Company.
Frank Allen testified that Colman had paid his fee
m the Hackett matter in the sum of $3,200.00. This
action was for the sole benefit of Anderson in dimunition of his liability to Colman and certainly any fee paid
should be born by Anderson. The evidence is conflicting
relative to the fee but reason indicates that at the
Hackett case was for the benefit of Anderson.
It was stipulated that Cohnan received stock from
Anderson for which he received $2,900.00.
A recapitulation shows the following as due Colman from Anderson:
Value of Kennebeck stock
$72,500.00
June 26, 1969
$ 2,100.00
Money loaned by Colman
Fee paid by Colman Hacket
case
$ 3,200.00
Obligation Anderson to Hackett$ 4,277.00
$82,077.00
Credit Hacket settlement to
Colman
Payment by Anderson

$14,000.00
$ 2,900.00
$16,900.00

$82,077.00
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$16,900.00
Due Colman

$65,177.00

D. Objections to F.indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The testimony is in direct conflict relative to
whether or not Colman knew of the Hackett loan prior
to the time Anderson informed him, Colman, that he
could not deliver the stock. Colman testimony ( R. 100,
Trans. 23) and the Anderson testimony is to the effect
that he notified Colman that he was negotiating with
Hackett in :May of 1968. The testimony is undisputed
that early in June of 1968, Colman told Anderson that
he was negotiating in the stock and that he had to have
it returned, Anderson testimony (R. 166, Trans. 89),
Colman testimony (R. 225, Trans. 148). There is absolutely no testimony that Colman ever took part in
any of the negotiations with Hackett and knew nothing
of the conditions of the Ilackett loan and the conveyance made by Anderson by reason of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9.
We cannot see how the Court could find as it did
in No. 5 of the Findings of Fact. ( R. 60)
We further contend that the Finding No. 7 (R. 60)
is not supported by the record. This transaction could
not have been a bailment, there was no consideration
and it certainly was not a transaction for the mutual
benefit of the parties. Even if this were construed as a
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bailment, we submit that no prudent man with 30 years
business experience would execute a document such as
Exhibit No. 9, to secure a loan.
The defendant filed a :Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact (R. 64) to the effect that the findings
should reflect the satisfaction of the debt owed by Anderson by reason of the Hackett settlement and the
payment of attorney's fee by Colman to Allen in the
sum of $3,200.00 for services performed by Allen in
the Hackett case. The Court refused to include the proposed in the Findings. '"' e have heretofore in this brief
referred to the admissions of the defendant that he owes
Colman the sum of $4,277.00.
We also take exception to Conclusion of Law No.
2 to the second cause of action (R. 60) which states that
the quit claim deed given by Anderson to Colman to
property in Box Elder County is void. There is no Finding which will support such a Conclusion. The validity
of the deed was not an issue in this case. Anderson admitted that he and his wife executed the deed and that
he delivered it to Colman ( R. 154, Trans. 77) . The respondent seems to base the Conclusion on the fact that
Anderson says that the signatures were not acknowledged at the time he delivered the deed. We submit that
this in no way affects the validity of the deed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we wish to point out that the record
shows a course of dealings between the parties whether
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all of the giving was on one side and all of the taking
was on the other. If the judgment of the lower court
is allowed to stand, it will allow Anderson to profit by
his breach of trust and his wrongful act.
Respectfully submitted,
NED WARNOCK,
of the firm of
CRITCHLOW, WATSON &
WARNOCK
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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APPENDIX "A"
Salt Lake City, Utah, June 12, 1968
To

Miller Finance Company

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I have this day assigned all my right, title and interest in ten thousand
shares of Kennebec stock to G. L. Hackett & Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
I hereby grant to G. L. Hackett & Company, the
Power of Attorney to sign my name to all papers and
to receive all documents, make endorsements, etc., in
order to complete and secure title and possession of said
stock.
'Vitness my hand this 12th day of June, 1968.

Sherill Dean Hall

Signed

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 12th day of June, 1968.
Notary
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APPENDIX "B"

June 13, 1968
Upon receipt of payment in full of my account, I hereby authorize the :Miller Finance Company to deliver to
G. L. Hackett and Company the following:
Note of :March 20, 1968 and 10,000 shares of
Kennebeck stock represented by certificate
no. 3182.
Isl

D. C. Anderson

